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Category-selective attention interacts with partial 
awareness processes in a continuous manner: An 
fMRI study
Shen Tu1*, Jerwen Jou2, Qian Cui3, Guang Zhao4, Kangcheng Wang5,6, Glenn Hitchman5,6, Jiang Qiu5,6 
and Qinglin Zhang5,6*
Abstract: Recently, our team found that category-selective attention could modulate 
tool processing at the partial awareness level and unconscious face processing in the 
middle occipital gyrus (MOG). However, the modulation effects in MOG were in oppo-
site directions across the masked tool and masked face conditions in that study: MOG 
activation decreased in the masked faces condition but increased in the masked tools 
condition under the consistent compared with the inconsistent cue-selective-atten-
tional modulation. In the present study, in order to confirm that the opposite effects 
were due to the changed contours of the tools, using the same tool pictures and fMRI 
technique, we devised another two conditions: variant mirror tool picture condition 
and invariant tool picture condition. The results showed that, during the variant mirror 
tool picture condition, activation in the MOG decreased under tool-selective attention 
compared with face-selective attention. Interestingly, however, during the invariant tool 
picture condition, activation in the MOG revealed neither positive nor negative changes. 
Combined with the result of increased MOG activity in the changed different tool condi-
tion, the three different effects demonstrated not only that the unconscious component 
of partial awareness processing (no knowledge of the identity of the tool) could be 
modulated by the category-selective attention in the earlier visual cortex but also that 
the modulation effect could further interact with the conscious component of partial 
awareness processing (consciousness of the changing contour of the tool) in a continu-
ous manner.
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1. Introduction
There are two ways by which consciousness states can interact with each other (Tu & Zhao, 2014): 
interactive influences within conscious or unconscious processes, and influences between conscious 
and unconscious processes. The former includes: (1) the interactive influences between conscious 
processes, which mainly reflect the role of attention on conscious processing (Carrasco, 2011; Cohen, 
Cavanagh, Chun, & Nakayama, 2012); (2) the interactions between unconscious processes, e.g. dif-
ferent unconscious processes influencing each other, leading to higher level unconscious processes 
(Tu, Martens, et al., 2013; Tu & Zhao, 2014). Regarding the latter, unconscious priming studies have 
revealed that unconscious information can affect subsequent conscious processing of information 
(Faivre & Kouider, 2011; Li, Paller, & Zinbarg, 2008). Likewise, conscious processes can also modulate 
subsequent unconscious processes (Kiefer & Martens, 2010; Martens & Kiefer, 2009; Marzouki, 
Grainger, & Theeuwes, 2007). Moreover, although consciousness can be dichotomous under some 
conditions, it can also be graded under other conditions (Windey, Vermeiren, Atas, & Cleeremans, 
2014). Therefore, there can be an intermediate or partial state of consciousness between a com-
pletely conscious and a completely unconscious state (Kouider, de Gardelle, Sackur, & Dupoux, 
2010). In a completely conscious or aware state, the observer is confident that he or she fully per-
ceives the presence and understands the identity of a target stimulus. In a completely unaware 
state, the observer does not sense the presence of a stimulus or any fragment or component of the 
contents of the stimulus, let alone the identity of the stimulus. A partial awareness state is one in 
which an observer senses some fragments or features of a stimulus without being able to determine 
its identity due to either the degraded nature of the stimulus caused by masking or a brief display 
period or divided attention (Kouider et al., 2010). How conscious top-down attention influences the 
information in partial awareness is unclear. Specifically, how conscious top-down processes interact 
with the unconscious level of representation in partial awareness is unknown.
In a recent study, Tu, Qiu, Martens, and Zhang (2013) presented a category cue word (e.g. face or 
tool) and followed it with a rapid serial presentation (with a stimulus duration of 16 ms) of either 
masked faces or masked tools. They found that participants were completely unaware of the pre-
sented faces but partially aware of the tools. That is, participants reported that they could not see 
anything of the rapidly presented faces, but that they could see some changing contours of the tools 
even though they could not identify what the objects were. Interestingly, Tu, Qiu, et al. (2013) found 
that category-selective attention or an expectation of a category of stimuli generated by the cue 
word could influence both subsequent unconscious face processing and partially conscious tool pro-
cessing. Since it is an expectation, it is a form of top-down attention (Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 
2011). In other words, the selective conscious, top-down attention invoked by the category cue can 
modulate both the completely unconscious and partially conscious stimulus processing that follows 
the cue word. The face contours in the presentation in Tu, Qiu, et al. (2013) experiment remained 
basically the same over the five rapid presentations whereas the tool contours changed from one 
masked presentation to the next. Tu, Qiu, et al. (2013) compared the middle occipital gyrus (MOG) 
activation levels across the face-cue-word/masked-face-display (FF), face-cue-word/masked-tool-
display (FT, also called FDT because the five masked tools are different tools which have different 
contours), tool-cue-word/masked-tool-display (TT, also called TDT), and tool-cue-word/masked-
face-display (TF) conditions. According to the predictive coding theory (Rao & Ballard, 1999), when 
the information in the cue is consistent with the visual information following the cue, activity in the 
early visual cortex will decrease compared with when the following information is inconsistent with 
the cue. We evaluated the MOG activation in these two conditions by comparing it with a baseline 
condition where either the face-cue-word was followed by a blank display (FB) or a tool-cue-word 
followed by a blank display (TB). Tu, Qiu, et al. (2013) found that for the masked face processing, the 
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modulation activation in the MOG decreased after the face selective attention cue compared with 
the tool selective attention cue, i.e. (FF − TF) < (FB − TB), which was consistent with the predictive 
coding theory (see Figure 1(A)). In contrast, for the masked different-tool processing, the modula-
tion activation in the MOG increased under the tool selective attention cue compared with the face 
selective attention cue, i.e. (TDT − FDT) > (FB − TB), which was the opposite of what the predictive 
coding theory predicts (see Figure 1(A)). To explain these results, the authors proposed an “excessive 
activation” hypothesis. According to that idea, although participants could not identify the masked 
presented tools, they were aware of the changing contours of the tools or partially aware of the 
presence of tools. When the unconscious “meaning” of the masked presented tools was consistent 
with the cue word, the incongruity caused by the changed contours could generate excessive activa-
tion in the MOG (Tu, Qiu, et al., 2013). The authors argued that this was an instance of selective 
conscious attentional modulation on the unconscious meaning of the masked targets interacting 
with a partially conscious process.
As noted above, in Tu, Qiu, et al.’s (2013) study, face and tool target conditions involved different 
conscious states, with face processing being completely unconscious and tool processing being par-
tially conscious. In that study, although the tool targets in the serial display had changing contours 
(there were five different tool pictures with different contours in a trial) which was similar to the 
repetition paradigm (Valyear, Gallivan, McLean, & Culham, 2012) and block design (Vingerhoets, 
2008) employed in previous research, the face targets did not (the five faces basically had the same 
contours). Therefore, different states of consciousness (partially conscious vs. completely uncon-
scious) and the changing vs. constant contours of the masked targets might have both played a role 
in causing the opposite patterns of results for the face and the tool processing conditions in the Tu, 
Qiu, et al.’s study (2013). In the present fMRI study, in order to determine whether only the changed 
contours of the tools could explain the opposite effects for the face and the tool cue conditions, we 
devised two additional conditions presented at the partial awareness level: a variant mirror-image 
tool picture condition (MT) and an invariant tool picture condition (IT).
Based on the predictive coding theory (Rao & Ballard, 1999) and the “excessive activation” hypothesis 
(Tu, Qiu, et al., 2013), we expected that the modulation activation in the MOG in the masked invariant 
tool picture condition would decrease after the tool selective attention cue compared with the face 
selective attention cue. Note that neither of the above conditions involved a contour change in the serial 
masked display and therefore both were expected to produce results similar to those in the completely 
unconscious face processing condition in Tu, Qiu, et al.’s (2013) experiment. However, for the masked 
variant mirror-image tool picture condition, the excessive activation hypothesis predicts that the modu-
lation activation in the MOG should increase after a tool selective attention cue compared with a face 
selective attention cue, which would be similar to the tool processing at a partial awareness level in Tu, 
Qiu, et al.’s (2013) experiment.
Figure 1. The percent signal 
change for each condition. 
(A) Data in Tu, Qiu, et al. 
(2013): (FF − TF) < (FB − TB), 
(TDT − FDT) > (FB − TB). (B) 
Data in the present study: 
(TIT − FIT) < (FB − TB), 
(TMT − FMT) = (FB − TB)
Notes: IT is the masked 
invariant tool picture; MT is the 
masked variant mirror-image 
tool picture; DT is the masked 
variant different tool picture; F 
is the masked face picture; B is 
the masked blank screen.
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Some previous studies have suggested that top-down attentional modulations on input visual 
information take place in the visual cortex (Bahrami, Lavie, & Rees, 2007; Rauss, Schwartz, & Pourtois, 
2011). Also, since the design in the present study was the same as in the Tu, Qiu, et al.’s (2013) study 
in which the top-down modulation was reflected in the MOG activation levels, we considered it rea-
sonable for us to use the MOG activities in the present study as an index of a top-down modulation 
effect. There is a need to mention an unexpected result of the present study here: the category- 
selective modulation effect could interact with the conscious component of the partial awareness 
processing (i.e. subjects’ awareness of the changing contour of the tool) in a continuous manner. As 
far as we know, this is the first time that the continuous nature of the interaction between top-down 
modulation and partial awareness processing was revealed.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Participants
A total of 20 adults (9 women and 11 men aged between 19 and 26 years; mean age 21.3 years) 
participated in this experiment voluntarily. All participants were right-handed and had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. No history of neurological or psychiatric disorders was reported. All par-
ticipants gave written informed consent after which the nature of the study was explained to them. 
This study has been approved by the IRB at Southwest University.
2.2. Stimuli
Twenty tool pictures and 20 pictures of other categories (e.g. faces, animals, fruits) were selected 
from the Internet as stimuli. All the pictures were grayscale images. In addition, all tool pictures 
were bilaterally asymmetrical to produce their mirror images. All mirror-image tool pictures were 
made from the original 20 pictures resulting in 40 tool pictures in total. In the experiment, the pic-
tures were displayed centrally on a uniform gray background and each picture subtended approxi-
mately 4.3 (height) × 3.8 (width) degrees of visual angles.
2.3. Procedure
E-prime 2.0 Software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc. http://www.pstnet.com) was used for present-
ing stimuli and recording behavioral data. There were six experimental conditions: face cue with 
masked invariant tool picture (FIT), face cue with masked variant mirror-image tool picture (FMT), 
face cue with masked blank screen (FB), tool cue with masked invariant tool picture (TIT), tool cue 
with masked variant mirror-image tool picture (TMT), and tool cue with masked blank screen (TB) in 
which no stimulus was presented. To avoid differences in low-level features, masked tools were 
counterbalanced between the FIT and TIT conditions, as were those between FMT and TMT and MT 
and IT conditions (Figure 2). Therefore, category-selective attention modulations on tool processing 
at the partial awareness level could not be attributed to low-level stimulus differences.
In the experiment, participants were asked to decide at the end of a trial whether a supraliminally 
presented picture matched the category given by a word cue at the beginning of a trial to make 
them attend to and retain the cue word during the trial. Between the cue word and the supraliminal 
picture, five masked tool pictures or five blank screens were presented. The stimulus sequence in a 
trial, which was similar to that in the study of Tu, Qiu, et al. (2013), was as follows (Figure 3): a cue 
word (“tool” or “face”) was first displayed for 500 ms followed by a scrambled picture which served 
as a forward mask for 383 ms. Then a target of a tool picture or a blank screen appeared for 16 ms, 
which was followed by a backward mask for 384 ms. As in Tu, Qiu, et al. (2013), the masked targets 
(a tool or a blank screen) and the backward masks were repeated five times. However, in this experi-
ment, there were two tool presentation versions. In the invariant version, the same tool picture was 
repeated five times within a trial. In the mirror-image version, a tool picture and its mirror image 
appeared alternately and the sequence of them was counterbalanced. The last mask was displayed 
for 400 ms, followed by a supraliminally displayed picture (either a tool, a face, a fruit or an animal) 
for 1,600 ms. Participants were asked to decide whether this picture matched the category of the 
word cue as quickly and accurately as possible by pressing a response button on a button box. The 
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participants were also informed that the masked stimuli were distractors. Between trials, a central 
fixation cross was presented for a jittered inter-trial interval of 2–6 s. Each condition contained 40 
trials resulting in 240 trials in total separated into two runs. The different conditions were displayed 
pseudorandomly. The response to response-key assignment was counterbalanced across partici-
pants. There were 70% consistent (the supraliminal picture matched the category of the word cue) 
and 30% inconsistent (the supraliminal picture did not match the category of the word cue) trials.
After fMRI scanning, an objective forced-choice task and a subjective report were conducted to 
evaluate the participants’ ability to recognize the masked tool pictures. The objective task preceded 
the subjective task. Before the objective forced-choice task began, participants were informed that 
a masked tool picture was repeatedly presented in each trial and that only the accuracy of their 
response was important. During this objective measure, participants were asked to make a forced-
choice discrimination while still lying in the scanner. The procedure was similar to that used during 
fMRI scanning, except that the IT and MT conditions were tested in two separate blocks with 20 trials 
in each block. In each trial, after the presentation of the last mask, two tool names with one denot-
ing the same tool as the masked tool picture presented before and the other naming a different tool 
were displayed on the left and right of the fixation point. Words but not pictures were used to avoid 
possible contour confusion (Tu, Qiu, et al., 2013). Participants were asked to judge which word 
matched the masked tool target. The two words remained on the screen until the participant made 
a response. For the subjective report, the participants were asked to tell whether they could sense 
the changes of contours and orientations of the masked tool pictures and whether they could tell 
what the masked tool pictures were for IT and MT blocks, respectively. The combination of the objec-
tive measure and subjective report was used to reveal whether the participants were partially aware 
of the masked pictures but unable to identify them.
Figure 2. Examples of masked 
stimuli.
Notes: Left: invariant tool 
pictures. Right: variant mirror-
image tool pictures. The 
pictures were counterbalanced 
between IT and MT conditions.
Figure 3. Schematic illustration 
of the task.
Notes: Participants were 
required to determine whether 
the last unmasked picture 
matched the word cue 
presented at the beginning of 
the sequence, and told that 
the stimuli between the word 
cue and supraliminal picture 
were distractors. Left: invariant 
tool pictures condition. Middle: 
variant mirror-image tool 
pictures condition. Right: blank 
condition.
……
Face
Tool500 ms
16 ms
384 ms
384 ms
1,600 ms
variable duration
400 ms
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2.4. fMRI data acquisition
Imaging data were acquired with a 3-T Siemens Trio Scanner (Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen, 
Germany) using a 12-channel birdcage headcoil. Two functional scans were acquired using an echo 
planar imaging (EPI) sequence (TR = 2,000 ms, TE = 30 ms, flip angle: 90°; field of view: 220 × 220 mm2; 
matrix size: 64 × 64). Each functional volume consisted of 32 axial slices of 3 mm thickness with a 
1 mm gap between slices. Each scan lasted approximately 15 min. Two dummy scans were per-
formed prior to the image acquisition to eliminate signals arising from progressive saturation.
2.5. fMRI data analysis
All pre-processing steps and statistical analyses were carried out using SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.
ac.uk/spm/software/spm8/). Prior to pre-processing, the first three volumes of each run were dis-
carded. For each participant, functional images were spatially aligned and slice-time corrected to the 
first volume of the first run, and then normalized to the EPI template brain. The normalized functional 
images (resampled at 3 mm3) were spatially smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of full width half-
maximum of 8 mm3. A 128s temporal high pass filter was applied to remove low-frequency scanner 
artifacts. Using a first-order autoregressive model (AR-1), temporal autocorrelations were estimated 
using restricted maximum likelihood estimates of variance components, and maximum likelihood 
estimates of the activations were formed using the previously resulting non-sphericity.
In statistical analyses, we constructed models of six regressors coding for onsets and durations (2 s)  of 
FIT, FMT, FB, TIT, TMT, and TB. The regressors were convolved with SPM8’s canonical hemodynamic  re-
sponse function (HRF) and the models were regressed against the observed BOLD data. As in the 
previous study of Tu, Qiu, et al. (2013), the fMRI activations of FIT, FMT, TIT, and TMT consisted of 
three cognitive processing components: cue, masked tool pictures, and modulation of the processing 
of the masked tool pictures by the cue. Next, analyses focused on category-selective attentional 
modulation on masked invariant tool pictures [(TIT − FIT) − (TB − FB)] and on masked variant mirror- 
image tool pictures [(TMT − FMT) − (TB − FB)] at an uncorrected threshold of p < .005 (cluster size > 50 
voxels). The activity (right MOG) was then corrected at a small volume (occipital gyrus) FWE corrected 
threshold of p < .05. The analyses included FB and TB conditions for excluding the pure top-down effects 
without the stimuli.
3. Results
3.1. Masked target visibility test
The participants reported not being able to recognize the masked tools. However, all of them reported 
being able to sense the changes of contours and orientations under the condition of the masked vari-
ant mirror-image tool pictures, and could sense the contours and orientations under the condition of 
the masked invariant tools. All 20 participants scored at chance level (binomial test, p > .05) for the 
forced-choice task, suggesting that participants were unable to recognize the masked tools. Also at 
the group level, discrimination performance did not deviate from chance level either (mean percent-
age correct = 50.03%, SD = .08, t(19) = .16, p > .05). These results suggested that participants could not 
consciously recognize the masked tool stimuli and were only partially aware of them.
3.2. Behavioral results
The accuracy rates of consistent and inconsistent trials (i.e. whether or not a supraliminally presented 
picture at the end of a trial matched the category cue at the beginning of a trial) were: 97.1 ± 4.1% (TIT), 
97.9 ± 2.4% (TMT), 97.5 ± 3.3% (TB), 99.2 ± 1.5% (FIT), 98.3 ± 2.6% (FMT), and 98.5 ± 2.2% (FB), respec-
tively. A two-way repeated-measures ANOVA with cue (tool vs. face) and target (IT vs. MT vs. blank 
screen) as factors revealed that neither of the main effects reached statistical significance, F(1, 19) = 3.13, 
p > .05, ηp2 = .14 for the cue, and F(2, 38) = .06, p > .05, ηp2 = .00 for the target. Nor was there a significant 
interaction between the two factors F(2, 38) = 1.88, p > .05, ηp2 = .09.
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We then calculated RTs only for correct trials, including both consistent and inconsistent trials. The 
RTs were (mean ± SE): 837.61 ± 25.56 ms (TIT), 833.63 ± 24.61 ms (TMT), 837.29 ± 26.28 ms (TB), 
717.22 ± 24.26 ms (FIT), 715.54 ± 19.75 ms (FMT), and 717.57 ± 21.27 ms (FB), respectively. A two-
way repeated-measures ANOVA, using cue (tool vs. face) and target (IT vs. MT vs. blank screen) as 
factors, revealed a main effect of cue, F(1, 19) = 59.06, p < .05, ηp2 = .76, demonstrating that partici-
pants exhibited significantly faster RTs to face than to tool cues. In contrast, the main effect of tar-
get did not reach statistical significance, F(2, 38) =  .16, p >  .05, ηp2 =  .01, nor was the interaction 
between the two factors significant, F(2, 38) = .02, p > .05, ηp2 = .01.
3.3. fMRI results
Analyses of category-selective attentional modulation on masked invariant tool picture processing 
showed decreased activity in the right MOG (x = 30, y = −81, z = 12; and t = 3.47) at an uncorrected 
threshold of p < .005 (cluster size > 50 voxels) after a whole-brain analysis [(TIT − FIT) < (TB − FB)], which 
disappeared when using a whole-brain correction. We then corrected the MOG activation from the 
uncorrected threshold result using a small volume FWE correction in the whole occipital cortex (stand-
ard brain atlas) at a threshold of p < .05 and the activity survived under the tool selective attention 
compared with the face selective attention condition (Figure 4). The analyses of category-selective 
attentional modulation on masked variant mirror-image tool picture processes revealed neither posi-
tive nor negative changes in activity in the occipital gyrus at an uncorrected threshold of p < .005 (clus-
ter size > 0 voxels) under tool selective attention compared with face selective attention condition 
[(TMT − FMT) = (TB − FB)], even at an uncorrected threshold of p < .01 (cluster size > 0 voxels).
To see whether the effects were constrained to the unilateral visual cortex or not, using a liberal 
uncorrected threshold of p < .05 (cluster size > 100 voxels), we observed a bilateral decrease in activ-
ity for masked invariant tool pictures in the visual cortex under the tool selective attention compared 
with the face selective attention (Figure 4). All results were visualized using xjView toolbox (http://
www.alivelearn.net/xjview).
To obtain more information regarding the last two comparisons, we extracted the percent signal 
change for each conditions (TIT, FIT, TMT, FMT, TB ,and FB) in a ROI sphere with a center at x = 30, 
y  =  −81, z  =  12, and a radius of 5  mm using Marsbar toolbox. The percent signal changes were 
(mean ± SE): .079 ± .016 (TIT), .073 ± .015 (FIT), .080 ± .018 (TMT), .058 ± .014 (FMT), .091 ± .017 (TB), 
and .065 ± .016 (FB), respectively (see Figure 1(B)). As our discussion refers to the combined results 
of this study and Tu, Qiu, et al. (2013), the MOG activity of TDT (Tool-cue/masked-Different-Tool), FDT 
(Face-cue/masked-Different-Tool), TB (Tool-cue/masked-Blank-screen), and FB (Face-cue/masked-
Blank-screen) conditions in Tu, Qiu, et al.’s (2013) study was also extracted. The location of the ROI 
for signal extraction was the same as in this research for accuracy of comparison. The percent signal 
changes were (mean ± SE): .421 ± .046 (TDT), .328 ± .032 (FDT), .377 ± .041 (TB), and .332 ± .035 (FB), 
respectively (see Figure 1(A)). We can see that the difference between TB and FB in Tu, Qiu, et al. 
(2013) (Figure 1(A)) showed a pattern similar to that in the present study (Figure 1(B)), i.e. TB > FB, 
and the modulation activation in the MOG increased successively as the changes of contour/shape 
of the masked tool pictures increased: (TIT  −  FIT)  <  (TB  −  FB) for masked invariant tool picture, 
(TMT − FMT) = (TB − FB) for masked variant mirror-image tool picture, and (TDT − FDT) > (TB − FB) 
masked variant different tool picture.
In addition, the contrast comparing the difference between (TIT − FIT) and the difference between 
(TMT − FMT) was also significant using percent signal change [t(19) = −2.21, p < .05], with (TIT − FIT) 
being smaller than (TMT − FMT) (see Figure 1(B)). Further, a two-way ANOVA with cue and masked 
stimuli as factors showed that the main effects and the interaction were all significant: cue, F(1, 
19) = 15.74, p < .05, ηp2 = .48; target, F(2, 38) = 4.63, p < .05, ηp2 = .21; interaction, F(2, 38) = 3.35, 
p <  .05, ηp2 =  .16. The simple effects revealed that effects of the masked stimuli were significant 
under both cues, Fs > 3.38, ps < .05. Specifically, the post hoc test showed that there is no difference 
between the three masked stimuli (DT, IT, B) under each cue (F, T) except FIT > FMT, TB > TIT, and 
TB > TMT (Figure 1(B)).
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4. Discussion
Tu, Qiu, et al. (2013) found that the modulation activation in the MOG under a masked face condition 
decreased under face-selective attention compared with tool-selective attention, i.e. (FF − TF) < (FB − TB), 
which was consistent with the predictive coding theory. However, they also found an opposite pattern of 
results in the masked tool condition which indicated that the modulation activation in the MOG increased 
under tool-selective attention compared with face-selective attention, i.e. (TDT − FDT) > (TB − FB), which 
contradicted the predictive coding theory. In the present fMRI study, we investigated whether the 
opposite effects of top-down category-selective attentional modulation observed in the masked face 
and tool conditions in Tu, Qiu, et al. (2013) were due to the changed contours of the tools at the partial 
awareness level. Consistent with this suggestion, the present results revealed that, in the IT condition, 
the modulation activation in the MOG decreased under the tool selective attention compared with the 
face selective attention condition, i.e. (TIT − FIT) < (TB − FB), which was similar to the result of the com-
pletely unconscious face condition in the Tu, Qiu, et al.’s (2013) study. Interestingly, however, in the MT 
condition, the modulation activation in the MOG revealed neither positive nor negative changes at a very 
liberal threshold, i.e. (TMT − FMT) = (TB − FB). Combined with the result of increased modulation activation 
in the MOG in the different tool condition in Tu, Qiu, et al. (2013), i.e. (TDT − FDT) > (TB − FB), the three 
different modulation effects under IT, MT, and DT conditions (Figure 5) demonstrated that not only could 
the unconscious component of partial awareness processing (meaning of the tool) be modulated by the 
category-selective attention in the earlier visual cortex but also that the modulation could further inter-
act with the conscious component of partial awareness processing (the changing contours of the tool) in 
a continuous manner (modulation activation in the MOG was from deactivation to no changes, and to 
increased activation). We discuss these results in detail below.
Some studies have found that visual areas are sensitive to repetition suppression (Weigelt, Muckli, & 
Kohler, 2008) and that repetition suppression effects occur only when the same exemplar of a category 
is repeatedly presented, but not when different exemplars are presented (Chouinard, Morrissey, Köhler, 
& Goodale, 2008). However, in this study, because the repetition suppression is assumed to influence 
both the cue/target congruent and the cue/target incongruent conditions equally, the potential repeti-
tion suppression should not have undermined our conclusion that the results reflect the interaction 
between category-selective attention and masked tools processing.
In addition, the present results suggest that the processing of the masked tools is at a partial 
awareness level. As noted in the introduction, partial awareness is an intermediate level between a 
completely conscious and a completely unconscious representation of information, with each repre-
sentation level accessible independently from the other (Kouider et al., 2010). In this experiment, 
participants could sense the contours of the masked tools but could not recognize them. In other 
words, participants were unconscious of the identity of the tools but conscious of some features of 
the tools. The dissociation between the above two levels of processing and their interaction with 
category-selective attention can explain the continuous changes of modulation activation in the 
MOG.
We draw two conclusions from this study. Firstly, in the IT condition, the modulation activation in 
the MOG decreased under the tool selective attention compared with the face selective attention 
condition. This finding is consistent with the predictive coding theory (Rao & Ballard, 1999), accord-
ing to which the brain estimates visual inputs with predictions from top-down signals, and tries to 
Figure 4. Statistical parametric 
maps for different threshold 
and cluster size.
Notes: Left column: 
(TIT − FIT) < (TB − FB). 
Statistical parametric 
maps were displayed at an 
uncorrected threshold of 
p < .005, cluster size > 50 
voxels. However, the activation 
was also significant at p < .05 
(small volume FWE correction 
in the whole occipital cortex). 
When processing masked 
invariant tools, activation 
in the right MOG decreased 
under the tool-selective 
attention compared with 
the face-selective attention 
condition. However, when 
processing masked variant 
mirror tools, neither positive 
nor negative changes in 
activity in the occipital gyrus 
was shown at an uncorrected 
threshold of p < .005 (cluster 
size > 0 voxels). Right column: 
Statistical parametric 
maps were threshold at 
p < .05, cluster size > 100 
voxels (uncorrected). When 
processing masked invariant 
tools, decreased bilateral 
activities were shown in the 
extensive occipital gyrus.
Page 10 of 13
Tu et al., Cogent Psychology (2015), 2: 1046243
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23311908.2015.1046243
reduce the mismatch between them. Similar results from other studies (that activation in lower 
visual areas is reduced when the stimuli are predictable or more coherent) are also consistent with 
predictive coding theory (Alink, Schwiedrzik, Kohler, Singer, & Muckli, 2010; Cardin, Friston, & Zeki, 
2011; Kok, Jehee, & de Lange, 2012). Likewise, Kiefer and Martens (2010) proposed the attentional 
sensitization model which can also explain top-down modulation on unconscious processing 
(Martens & Kiefer, 2009; Naccache, Blandin, & Dehaene, 2002; Shin, Stolte, & Chong, 2009). However, 
these results are primarily from conscious processing studies. For an investigation of this issue at 
the unconscious level, Tu, Qiu, et al. (2013) revealed that activation in the MOG, which reflected 
the category-selective attentional modulation on completely unconscious face picture processing, 
decreased under the face selective attention compared with the tool selective attention cue. 
Similarly, attentional load, which is measured by the attention demand of a central task and can be 
regarded as an irrelevant top-down factor, is also found to modulate the responses to unconscious 
stimuli in the primary visual cortex (Bahrami et al., 2007). Therefore, the predictive coding theory 
might also be applied to unconscious processing, and hence it is reasonable to suggest that top-
down category-selective attention can modulate the unconscious component of partial awareness 
as well in the earlier visual cortex.
Secondly and interestingly, in the MT condition, the modulation activation in the MOG revealed 
neither positive nor negative changes in activity across the two category cue conditions. On the 
other hand, Tu, Qiu, et al. (2013) have found increased modulation activation in the MOG during a 
masked different tool picture presentation, and hypothesized that the incongruity caused by 
changed tool contours at the partial awareness level leads to excessive activation in the MOG when 
the unconscious meaning of the tool is consistent with the cue. The excessive activation hypothesis 
was supported by findings from a recent ERP study using a similar paradigm to the present one but 
with only one presentation of the masked stimulus in a trial (Liu et al., 2015). The ERP results dem-
onstrated that, regardless of whether the masked stimulus was completely or partially unconscious, 
C1 component was smaller in the consistent cue condition than in the inconsistent cue condition. 
However, based on the combined results of the three conditions from this study and Tu, Qiu, et al. 
(2013) (invariant tool contour, mirror-image tool contour, and different tool contour, Figure 5), the 
excessive activation hypothesis can be expanded into a more general one which posits that not only 
can the category-selective attention modulate the unconscious component of partial awareness 
processing but the modulation effect can further interact with the conscious component of it as well 
in a continuous manner (Figure 5). Specifically, category-selective attention reduced MOG activation 
caused by the unconscious “meaning” of the tool targets when cue and targets were congruent. On 
Figure 5. Summary of three 
conditions: (a) schematic 
illustration of stimulus 
displays; (b) summary of the 
results of the three conditions 
(IT = masked invariant tool 
picture; MT = masked variant 
mirror-image tool picture; 
DT = masked different tool 
picture).
Source: Modified from a review 
paper by Tu and Zhao (2014).
cue mask stimulus 1 mask maskstimulus 2 response
Tool
Face
Cue is
consistent with
masked stimuli 
compete
repress
extent of
contour change activation in MOG
no change
decreased
increased
IT
MT
DT
(a)
(b)
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the other hand, the MOG activation increased with the increase in the change of contours which is 
consistent with the finding that activation in V1/V2 areas decreased with increased stimulus “col-
linearity” and that activation in the middle occipital cortex decreased with increased “meaning con-
gruency”, and vice versa (Cardin et al., 2011). More importantly, the MOG effect caused by the change 
of target contours interacts in a continuous manner with the top-down category-selective atten-
tional modulation on the unconscious “meaning” of the tool targets: the more incongruity in the 
changed pattern that was generated by the variant tool contours at the partial awareness level, the 
more excessive activation in the MOG occurred when the unconscious “meaning” of the tool was 
consistent with the cue (however, the contour manipulation in the masked tool condition, i.e. the 
normal vs. its mirror image, might not have been large enough to cause the signal change in the TMT 
condition to deviate from that of the TIT condition). On the other hand, the more congruity in the 
changed pattern generated by the variant tool contours at the partial awareness level, the more 
deactivation in the MOG when the unconscious “meaning” of the tool is inconsistent with the cue 
(see the point corresponding to FMT in Figure 1(B)). We suggest that the seemingly continuously 
changed modulation activation in the MOG is caused by the interaction between the extent of the 
changed contour at the partial awareness level and the top-down modulation of the unconscious 
meaning of the tool targets.
Casali et al. (2013) recently discovered a quantitative/continuous measure of the level of con-
sciousness with EEG called the perturbational complexity index (Casali et al., 2013). Similarly, Kouider 
et al.’s (2010) the partial awareness hypothesis postulates that access to consciousness could be 
graded. Unfortunately, the quantitative/continuous notion of consciousness is seldom used in fMRI 
studies, leading to dichotomizing the fMRI research into unconscious and conscious domains 
of studies. The possible exceptions are studies using varied attentional loads (Lv et al., 2010). For 
example, Bahrami et al. (2007) found that responses to the unconscious stimuli in the primary visual 
cortex decreased significantly under high attentional load compared with low attentional load in the 
central task. As noted above, attentional load is measured by the demand of a central task and thus 
can be regarded as an irrelevant top-down factor as should also have been the case in the inconsist-
ent conditions (FIT or FMT) of the present study. So far, not enough attention is given to the quantita-
tive/continuous notion of consciousness in current fMRI studies. The findings of continuous changes 
of modulation activation in the MOG in this study can hopefully provide a needed impetus to encour-
age conceptualizing consciousness as a quantitative/continuous construct in future fMRI research 
on consciousness.
Finally, although we have interpreted our results as supporting the “excessive activation” and 
“continuous manner” hypotheses, these hypotheses might be better assessed in future studies by 
testing three conditions in an experiment, i.e. an invariant tool picture condition, a variant mirror 
tool picture condition, and a different tool picture condition without the category cues. Under the 
present design, the information provided by the category cues cannot be separated from informa-
tion potentially originating from the signal change of the masked stimuli. In addition, especially 
relevant to the issue of the “continuous nature of consciousness”, future studies can include condi-
tions in which the same tool is presented in many different orientations similar to the method 
employed in mental rotation experiments (Shepard & Metzler, 1971). The moderate contour change 
of normal vs. mirror images used in the present experiment might be the reason why the signal 
change in the TMT condition did not deviate much from that of the TIT condition. In a word, although 
the combined results showed that not only could the unconscious component of partial awareness 
processing be modulated by the category-selective attention in the MOG but also that the modula-
tion could further interact with the conscious component of partial awareness processing in a con-
tinuous manner, the detail mechanism needs further investigation.
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